More and more order-driven markets now allow traders to submit hidden orders.
Introduction
The current proliferation of limit order book systems leads to a growing interest on liquidity dynamics in such a market design. Since traders can choose to supply or consume liquidity, understanding how they behave in an order-driven environment is increasingly relevant. Empirical research has evidenced that traders' behavior is significantly affected by market conditions: traders tend to provide liquidity when the bid-ask spread is large and the order book is thin. Indeed, to determine their order placement strategy at a given time, traders rely on information available on the market screens.
Nowadays, most order-driven trading systems as well as hybrid markets diffuse their limit order book in real time, or at least, the 5 best limits. So, market participants are now used to observe a large set of information such as price and disclosed depth available at the different bid-ask quotes. Moreover, they often have access to price and size of last trades. However, orders and trades often remain anonymous.
While most trading systems have moved towards greater transparency, there is today a patent trend to give market participants the opportunity to limit their exposure. Indeed, the use of undisclosed quantities has become a widespread practice over the world, whatever the market design. Even if hidden order processing differs slightly from a trading system to another, liquidity providers can reduce their exposure when trading on Euronext, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Australian Stock Exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange or Inet ATS.
1 Similarly, Nasdaq market makers as well as MTS 2 market makers have the ability to post additional depth in their quotes that is not visible to the market place. Numerous papers [Biais, Hillion & Spatt (1995) , Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull & White (2000) , Ranaldo (2004) , Beber & Caglio (2003) , Pascual & Veredas (2003) ...] assume and demonstrate that traders base their order placement upon information observable in the limit order book. However, as information is a key element when making a trading decision, a reasonable hypothesis is that, even if market participants cannot estimate the magnitude of hidden depth in the order book, they are able to detect whether hidden orders are present at the best quotes or not. Indeed, it is well-known that traders monitor the limit order book and that they can infer from changes in observable information whether undisclosed depth is likely to be present or not at the best bid or ask. Actually, when hidden depth at the best quote is hit, a new quantity is automatically disclosed to the market place. So, traders are expected to guess the presence of undisclosed orders by monitoring limit order book movements.
In this paper, we check whether traders account for the presence of hidden quantities at the best limit of the order book when submitting their orders on Euronext. Thanks to very detailed order book data, we are able to know whether hidden depth is available at the best bid or ask at any time during the continuous session. Assuming that market participants can detect this undisclosed depth, we analyze how this new piece of information can affect traders' behavior. In the same time, we also show how implicit transaction costs can be overestimated when ignoring the presence of hidden orders in the order book.
This empirical paper and its main results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, we report accurate findings about undisclosed liquidity for a large sample of stocks. To date, hidden depth has been rarely investigated, often for lack of complete order book data. We show how the presence of hidden orders can substantially reduce implicit transaction costs on Euronext. Next, we propose a new order aggressiveness classification which depends on how the order arrival affects the prevailing spread or depth available at the best limit of the order book. Using an ordered probit model, we highlight how the presence of hidden depth at the best quotes can significantly influence traders' behavior on Euronext. Such findings are of great interest to market authorities, microstructure researchers and, of course, to traders who deal with best execution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, empirical and institutional background is presented. Section 3 describes the data and the stock sample. Methodologies and empirical findings are reported in Section 4. The first subsection is devoted to implicit transaction costs. Order aggressiveness is analyzed in the second subsection while the impact of hidden order presence on traders' behavior is reported in the third subsection. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background

Empirical Background
With the increasing availability of detailed information such as time-stamped data about trades and orders, market microstructure researchers are now allowed to empirically investigate at a level of detail never before possible. However, research is always seeking for new possible extensions and more and more sophisticated data are often required to improve our knowledge about market dynamics and traders' behavior.
Although market data were often limited to transaction prices and best quotes during the eighties (see Harris (1986) , Admati & Pfleiderer (1988) and Stoll (1989) ), intraday data about orders became necessary in the nineties for analyzing order placement strategies (e.g. Harris (1996) and McInish & Wood (1995) ), price discovery (Biais, Hillion & Spatt (1999) ), and other issues focusing on order flow. Recently, the needs for more complete and detailed databases arose again in order to better understand traders' behavior (Kavajecz (1999)) or liquidity dynamics (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyan (2002) and Domowitz & Xiaoxin (2002) ). Facing these requirements, some researchers try to combine very detailed data about orders and trades to obtain the state of the order book. As mentioned by Kavajecz & Odders-White (2004) , the principle behind the order book estimation is that, at any time, the order book should reflect orders remaining after netting all prior execution and cancellation records. These methodologies often result in an approximation of the actual order book because of the incompleteness of the databases or the complexity of programming the numerous rules organizing the market trading session. In this paper, we use very detailed information about trades and orders recorded on Euronext and we account for the different market rules in our algorithm. The output is a complete limit order book available at any time and including all the features defining order price and time priorities.
Defined by Black (1971) , market liquidity has been widely analyzed in the literature. Since two liquidity dimensions -tightness and depth -are closely related to implicit costs incurred by traders, we mainly focus on these dimensions. Tightness implies that the bid-ask spread is narrow while depth refers to quantities available in the limit order book. While most databases now allow for analyzing spreads in a suitable way, assessing depth involves several difficulties. For example, on the NYSE, the order data used by Kavajecz (1999) allow for the construction of an estimate of the limit order book but this estimate is incomplete since orders brought to the floor via a floor broker are not included. Another example is the investigation of Degryse, de Jong, van Ravenswaaij & Wuyts (2002) about market resiliency. Since hidden depth was not available in their database, these authors had to comment their results carefully. In this paper, we assess implicit transaction costs with the Cost of Round Trip Trade. This ex-ante measure of immediate liquidity for a given trade size was proposed by Irvine, Benston & Kandel (2000) and makes it possible to account for both the spread and the volume (displayed and hidden) available at the different limit prices in the order book.
In the literature, several empirical studies dealing with order aggressiveness used databases that were already quite detailed. Indeed, the famous classification scheme proposed by Biais et al. (1995) relates order price and size to the prevailing bid and ask quotes. This methodology was later applied by Bisière & Kamionka (2000) on the Paris bourse and by Griffiths et al. (2000) on the Toronto Stock Exchange. All these studies focus on traders' behavior and more specifically on their order placement strategies. These strategies rely on information available to traders when placing their orders. On a market where hidden orders are allowed, it is quite natural to base the order aggressiveness analysis on displayed depth associated with the best limit. However, two elements are worth noticing.
First, aggressiveness is closely linked to liquidity in an order-driven market since aggressive orders take liquidity from the market while passive orders provide liquidity.
In the paper, a slightly different aggressiveness classification from the one designed by Biais et al. (1995) will be proposed in order to better link the two concepts. It focuses more on how the order arrival affects market liquidity (prevailing spread or depth) than on how the order is executed (totally or partially filled) at its arrival on the market. As market authorities may be interested in knowing who is taking or supplying liquidity, order aggressiveness will also be classified according to the total depth available at the best quotes, i.e. both displayed and hidden depths. As shown in D 'Hondt, De Winne & Francois-Heude (2004) , displayed depth is a very poor proxy for real depth on Euronext and it could be informative to analyze the impact of hidden depth on the order aggressiveness classification.
Second, the questions of what a trader can know from the observation of sequential order book states and which set of information he uses before submitting an order are very relevant. It is well-known among practitioners that, even if traders do not observe hidden depth, they can infer the presence of hidden orders at the best quotes from changes in the displayed limit order book. These questions will be addressed in this paper using ordered probit models.
Institutional Background
Euronext is now one of the most important markets in Europe 3 and relies on a homogeneous order-driven structure. 4 Its platform is very transparent since market participants have access to the whole order book (pre-trade transparency) and can immediately observe the last trades recorded by the system (post-trade transparency). However, two features reduce market transparency. First, orders and trades are anonymous since April 2001, so that pre-trade transparency and post-trade transparency are affected. Second, the so-called hidden or iceberg orders make it possible to disclose only a part of the order size to the market place. The Euronext continuous trading system enforces a price-time order precedence rule to arrange trades. Though the market opens at 9:00 a.m. with a call auction, traders can place, modify or cancel orders from 7:15 a.m. without any trade taking place before 9:00 a.m. The market closes at 17:30 p.m. with a second call auction following a short pre-closing period of 5 minutes. Both opening and closing prices are set by crossing the supply and demand curves and selecting the price that maximizes the trading volume.
During the continuous session, orders are partially or totally executed if they hit a quote on the opposite side of the order book. If no suitable counterpart exists, orders are registered in the book according to their price and time priorities. Traders can submit limit orders at any price on a pricing grid defined by a tick size. They can also submit market-to-limit orders which are executed at the best opposite quote. If the liquidity available at this best quote is insufficient to totally fill the order, the excess is converted into a limit order at that price. Market orders are orders that will be immediately executed in full at any price. The order book is instantaneously updated on traders' screens when an order is placed, modified or canceled. At any time during the pre-opening/closing period, an indicative market-clearing price that would result from the order book is displayed on the market place, together with the indicative trading volume at that price, and the other disclosed bid and ask quotes at that price.
Euronext trading system offers traders to submit limit orders that are not fully disclosed to other market participants. These orders are called hidden orders or iceberg orders.
5 The disclosed quantity is the number of shares the trader wishes to be displayed on the market screens. When a hidden order is filled for its disclosed quantity, this quantity is automatically renewed and the order is positioned behind other orders at the same limit price. This disclosure of hidden quantities makes the limit order book different from what one could expect after a given trade. So, traders monitoring the limit order book are expected to infer the presence of hidden depth. Undisclosed quantities are not exposed to the market place but are available to market authorities. It is worth noticing that, before December 2003, only Euronext members had access to the whole limit order book, except hidden quantities and members' identification codes (ID codes) while other traders could observe the aggregate 5 best limits of the order book. Today, the access to all quotes making the order book has been extended to the market place.
Dual-trading is allowed on Euronext. Hence, market members are brokers-dealers. They can submit orders either for their own account (own account orders) or for the account of their customers (client orders). Besides, for small and mid caps, market members may act as liquidity providers.
6 As market specialists for their stocks, liquidity providers have a commercial agreement with Euronext whereby they undertake to quote two-way bid and ask prices in the limit order book, with a minimum volume and within a maximum spread. According to Euronext, the role of liquidity providers is to protect against variations in volatility, to guarantee trades at all times and to boost trading volumes.
3 Data and Sample
Data description
Each month, Euronext publishes very detailed data about orders, trades and best quotes of the order book. These intraday data allow for a large variety of empirical work. For our investigations, we used public data about orders and trades for a sample of 82 common stocks belonging to AEX, Bel20 or CAC40 indexes 7 over the threemonth period from October 1 to December 31, 2002. The public trade data include the identification code of the stock, the date and time of the trade (with a precision to the second), the trade price and the number of shares traded. The public order data contain the following information: the identification code of the stock, the date and time of order submission, the order direction (buy/sell), both total order size and disclosed quantity ("peak") for iceberg orders, the order type (limit order, market-tolimit order, market order), the limit price (if any), the date of order validity and the state of the order at a particular date (totally executed, modified, cancelled, ...). Two codes referenced both by day and by market member are also mentioned in this public order data set. They allow for linking records describing different states of a single order that has been modified. In addition to publicly available information, Euronext provided us with other private information that are necessary for rebuilding the limit order book.
8 Hence, we received market members' ID codes 9 for both orders and trades. For orders, we got information about the time when an order disappears from the system (cancellation or total execution for example) and the date of the order modification if any. As for trades, we obtained the date when both buy and sell orders triggering a given trade have been introduced (or last modified) and the sequence number of both orders included in the order file. This additional information allows us to identify which orders initiated a particular trade. Another important piece of information we got for each order referred in the database is under which status the market member submitted the order. As explained before, a market member on Euronext can act as a broker when he submits orders on his customers' behalf (client orders), as a dealer when he submits orders for his own account (own account orders) or as a liquidity provider when he submits orders within 7 These indexes contain the blue chips of the former stock exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris that merged in order to create Euronext. During November 2002, GIB was replaced by Mobistar in the Belgian Bel20 index. We decided to exclude both stocks from our sample. The exit of the CMG stock from the AEX index led to its exclusion from our sample as well.
8 Given the organization of the different databases, rebuilding the order book is impossible with public data only. Several operations, such as order modifications, actually have to be related to the original order within the set of orders submitted by the same member.
9 Actually, these ID codes are not sufficient to know the market members' identities but allow us to isolate the whole set of orders or trades associated with a given member from the other orders and trades in the sample. the context of his commercial agreement with Euronext (LP orders). In the paper, we will consider that client orders, own account orders and LP orders are three different order status.
Thanks to both public and private data, we have developed a program allowing us to rebuild the limit order book second by second. Within this program, 10 the state of the order book is updated whenever a new order is submitted, a standing limit order is modified or cancelled. The output is accurate order book data including aggregate displayed and hidden quantities associated with each limit price. This new information set is very valuable because we can know, at any moment, what Euronext members observe in real time on their computer screens but also hidden quantities available at every quote on both bid and ask sides. Furthermore, ID codes allow us to know how many market members supply depth at a particular price as well as under which status they do this.
Sample presentation
The market value of our stock sample is about 1000 billion euros and the traded volume is above 300 billion euros for our three-month period. Tables 2 and 3 give more information about activity and market capitalization. For the 82 stocks, we have 19 670 023 states of the limit order book during the continuous session 11 . Different usual liquidity measures for each stock are reported in Tables 4 and 5 . For the purpose of comparison across stocks, time-weighted depth measures are expressed in EUR by multiplying the number of shares by the mid-quote. We can observe that Belgian stocks have spreads that are twice as large as AEX or CAC stocks. Depth measures are also much worse for Belgian stocks which are undoubtedly the least liquid in our sample. During our three-month period, three out of them are even subject to liquidity provider agreements (UMICORE, ALMANIJ, BEKAERT). The fourth stock (BUHRMANN) in our sample for which liquidity providers are present is a Dutch one. On average, displayed depth at the best quotes only accounts for half of the total depth available at these prices while about 40% of depth at the five best quotes is hidden. This confirms the relevance of our investigations since ignoring hidden depth may lead to strong empirical biases. Depth at the best quotes represents slightly less than 20% of the aggregate volumes available at the five best quotes.
Looking at individual depth measures, we can observe that a greater proportion of depth is displayed on the Dutch segment. Since the microstructure is similar across the three indexes, this difference is difficult to explain. The French and Dutch subsamples are very similar in terms of market capitalization and activity. So, the only 10 A note describing the methodology applied to build the limit order book from Euronext order and trade files is available on request.
11 Due to their specific trading process, pre-auction periods have been dropped from our analysis. 
Implicit Transaction Costs
As mentioned by Irvine et al. (2000) , an ex ante liquidity measure is useful to indicate the upper bound of transaction cost at which an order can be immediately executed. However, on a market where hidden orders are allowed, undisclosed quantities are likely to significantly lower this cost compared with what one may expect from the displayed quantities in the limit order book. This should be especially true for large trades.
Methodology
At a given point in time, the Cost of Round Trip Trade for a trade size T corresponds to the difference between the cost of buying T shares of a stock and the amount received from selling these T shares. Due to the spread, this difference is always positive in continuous trading. For the purpose of comparison across stocks or trade sizes, this difference is divided by the value of these T shares at the mid-point. So, given the limit order book described in Table 1 , the Cost of Round Trip Trade for a trade size of 750 shares of stock i at time t will be computed as follows, according to either the displayed depth (CRT We compute both measures every time an order is placed for each stock in our sample. Since required market depth is more important for large trades, computing these costs for large trade sizes should lead to even more striking differences. To show evidence of this phenomenon, we decided to compute the CRT for 3 different trade sizes. The first one is equal to the median order size computed over the three-month period for the given stock. Both other trade sizes correspond respectively to the upper quartile and the upper percentile computed across order sizes for the given stock. To give an idea about the numbers of shares in question, these different trade sizes are presented for each stock in Tables 6 and 7.
Results
Implicit transaction cost indicators for each stock in our sample are provided in Tables  8 and 9. 14 For Dutch stocks, hidden depth contributes on average to a CRT reduction of about respectively 3%, 6% and 18% when the trade size is equal to the median, upper quartile or upper percentile order size. As for Belgian stocks, the presence of hidden orders leads on average to a decrease in implicit transaction costs of about respectively 4%, 7% and 29% while the average reduction ranges from 5% to 32% for French stocks. As expected, we can conclude that accounting for hidden depth leads to a substantial decrease in the CRT, especially for large trades. So, all these figures show how much liquidity assessment can be improved when we take hidden quantities into account. By ignoring them, we tend to substantially underestimate the available liquidity on Euronext. This kind of bias can be quite annoying when making comparisons across competitive market venues or trading systems.
Concerning differences across stocks, we can see in Tables 8 and 9 that the CRT for a given trade size is quite similar for stocks belonging to AEX and CAC indexes but almost twice higher for Belgian stocks. This finding is totally consistent with other usual liquidity measures described earlier. Moreover, the impact of hidden quantities on implicit transaction costs appears the lowest for Dutch stocks. This result is due to the highest proportion of displayed depth for these stocks.
Order Aggressiveness
Methodology
While order aggressiveness has been usually studied as a feature of traders' behavior, it can also be viewed as a measure of the extent to which orders take liquidity from the market or supply liquidity to the market. The order aggressiveness classification we propose differs from the Biais et al. 's (1995) one for the most aggressive orders. Our proposal includes five categories that will be exposed with regards to the "liquidity effect", i.e. how the order arrival affects the prevailing liquidity. The first two categories contain orders taking liquidity and are the most aggressive ones. They affect either the best opposite quote (category 1) or the depth associated with that best quote (category 2). Categories 3 and 4 contain less aggressive orders which improve liquidity in terms of best quote on the same side (category 3) or in terms of depth available at that best quote (category 4). All other orders fall into the fifth category and increase the overall depth in the order book without affecting the best limit in terms of either price or quantities. So, the aggressiveness classification of orders resulting in immediate execution (categories 1 and 2) is based on the opposite quote as well as on the depth available at that quote. For other orders, the aggressiveness classification will rely on the best quote on the same side as the incoming order and its associated depth. A numerical example illustrating this new aggressiveness classification is provided in appendix.
Thanks to our full order book data, we are able to know, for each order in our sample, the state of the prevailing order book. Therefore, we can easily apply our methodology and compare both price and size of any order to the relevant quote and depth. Moreover, we can categorize orders conditional on the state of either the displayed order book or the real order book (including hidden quantities). Of course, we expect that accounting for hidden depth leads to a significant shift of orders from the first category to the second one.
To identify potential disparities in aggressiveness, we conducted our classifications by taking into account both the order status (client/own account/LP) and the order direction (buy/sell). Indeed, we can expect that market members submit orders differently according as whether they act as brokers, dealers or liquidity providers. Intuitively, market members are expected to pay more attention to their own orders than to their customers' orders. This could be illustrated by a greater impact of the order book state on own account orders than on client orders. Another explanation could be that some customers place their orders through a market member without asking for any advice. Again, this phenomenon could lead to a smaller influence of the prevailing order book on client order aggressiveness. The development of online trading and direct market access should lead more customers to submit their orders by themselves. In this case, they should have less experience in monitoring the market than practitioners have. Besides, when acting as liquidity providers, market members are expected to be less aggressive and less sensitive to market conditions. Indeed, it is worth recalling that liquidity providers have specific commitments when quoting two-way bid and ask prices in the order book.
For the purpose of statistical comparisons across order status, we first conducted our order aggressiveness classification trading day by trading day.
15 Then, paired ttests were performed to compare client orders or LP orders with own account orders to check the above assumptions. If we analyze findings for each order status, we can observe that the most frequent events are always orders of the fifth category, whatever the order direction. Next, we can see that the proportion of liquidity taking orders is respectively about 34%, 38% and 30% for client, own account and LP orders. Not surprisingly, LP orders are on average less liquidity consuming than client or own account orders. However, about 24% of them are ranked in the first category and can be defined as very aggressive orders. Actually, when Euronext members have a liquidity provider agreement for a given stock, they pay lower explicit transaction costs for non client orders. This can explain some shift from own account to LP orders. Concerning differences between client and own account orders, we find that all seem significant at the 1% level. Although the fraction of liquidity taking orders is only slightly higher for own account orders, the distribution of orders across the first two categories (aggressive orders) as well as across the last three categories (passive orders) differs much more. For example, 36% of client orders falls into the fifth category compared with 24% for own account orders.
Results
As for comparisons between own account and LP orders, most differences appear significant. The two most striking ones concern categories 2 and 5. Indeed, LP orders exhibit few orders in the second category (4%) but much more in the last category (40%) in comparison with own account orders (16% and 24%).
Finally, Table 10 also reports some differences between client and LP orders. The most significant ones are related to liquidity taking orders. On average, 12% (24%) and 21% (6%) of client (LP) orders fall respectively into categories 1 and 2.
Results based on both displayed and real order book data are presented in Table 11 . Of course, whatever the order status, accounting for hidden depth leads to a significant shift of orders from the first to the second aggressiveness category. Indeed, when we categorize orders according to the real depth available in the prevailing order book, the reduction in orders ranked in category 1 reaches about 24% for client orders, 30% for own account orders and 19% for LP orders. The impact of hidden depth appears much stronger for own account orders. Since large orders are more likely to fall into the first aggressiveness category, this finding could be explained by a larger size for own account orders. Indeed, for 49 stocks in our sample, average order size for own account orders is significantly larger than for client orders 16 .
Presence of hidden orders and traders' behavior
As Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004) and Pascual & Veredas (2003) do on other pure order-driven markets (Toronto Stock Exchange, Swiss Stock Exchange, Spanish Stock Exchange), it seems quite natural to assume that traders base their order placement upon information observable in the limit order book. However, it is well-known that monitoring the limit order book can help practitioners to detect the presence of hidden orders. So, we can wonder whether order submission can be affected by hidden depth.
From Table 12 we can observe that the presence of hidden depth at the best quote is approximately equally frequent on both sides of the limit order book. In continuous trading, hidden depth on each side is present for about 26% of time. Because traders infer the presence of hidden depth from limit order book changes, we computed the duration of these situations in number of limit order book states. So , Table 12 tells us that, when there is hidden depth at the best bid/ask, this situation exists for a sequence of 8.2/8.3 order book states on average. When there is no hidden depth, the duration rises to 25.5/25.4 states of the order book. Then, durations are sufficiently high to allow traders who detected hidden depth to adapt their order placement. In this context, analyzing whether the presence of hidden orders affects traders' behavior becomes a relevant issue.
Methodology
In order to address this issue, an ordered probit model will be used to analyze how the prevailing order book state (including the presence of hidden orders) can influence traders' behavior or, more specifically, their order aggressiveness.
So, we assume that traders' aggressiveness is a function of several elements such as spread, depth measures and the presence of hidden orders. More precisely, traders' aggressiveness (A t ) at time t is assumed to be explained as follows :
Most of these explanatory variables are easily observed in the limit order book prevailing at time t. Spread t denotes the prevailing absolute bid-ask spread when the order is submitted at time t. Depth S/O 1/+ is the number of shares at the first limit (1) or at the four next ones (+) on the same side (S) as the incoming order or on the opposite side (O). Hidden S/O are dummy variables indicating the presence of hidden orders at the best quote on the same side (S) or on the opposite side (O). These dummies are not observable but the presence of hidden orders at the best quote is expected to be inferred from the sequence of limit order book movements. t represents the independent but not identically distributed residuals. In order to avoid correlations across depth measures, we replaced Depth As traders' aggressiveness is not directly observable, we can consider Equation [1] as a latent one. However, the order submitted by a trader at time t can inform us about the trader's aggressiveness. Applying the order classification described previously and based on disclosed order book information, we get an observable discrete variable Cat t linked to the latent variable A t . The relationship between the latent variable and the ordered response is expressed as follows :
Equations [1] and [2] form an ordered probit model whose parameters β k and γ j can be estimated. Actually, the γ j 's are thresholds that determine what value of Cat t a given value of A t will map into.
Denoting the normal cumulative distribution function as Φ(.), the probability that Cat t = 1 is computed as follows :
The probability that Cat t = m (where m = 2, 3 or 4) is computed as follows :
The probability that Cat t = 5 is computed as follows :
Hence, parameters are estimated by maximizing the loglikelihood function for the ordered probit model consisting of Equations [1] and [2] :
In order to check the relevance of hidden depth in order placement, we also propose a slightly different probit model, where both dummies have been dropped. Replacing Equation [1] by Equation [7] , we can compute the Likelihood Ratio in order to find which model is the best one.
A t = β 1 * Spread t + β 2 * Depth Table 13 reports a summary of the results for the whole sample. Tables 16 to 18 give the parameter estimates 17 for the thresholds as well as for the explanatory variables.
Economic intuition gives some expectations for these parameters. First, order aggressiveness (A t ) should be negatively correlated with spread since it is more difficult to have one's own order executed when the spread is narrow. Next, depth observable on the same side (i.e. bid for buy orders and ask for sell orders) should encourage traders to be more aggressive in their order placement. Indeed, if a trader submits a non marketable order, it has a lower time priority than other orders already into the system. So, he needs to improve his price condition to gain priority (competition effect). However, order aggressiveness should be negatively correlated with depth observable on the opposite side because traders are more confident about their order execution. Many quantities available at the opposite quotes are likely to match their own order (strategic effect). Finally, according to Pardo & Pascual (2003) who analyzed the market response when the presence of hidden orders is publicly revealed to the market place, hidden order execution makes traders more aggressive. So, we expect that both parameters relative to the dummy variables will be positive. Indeed, the presence of hidden depth at the best bid (ask) should encourage buyers (sellers) to submit orders at least as aggressive. A similar effect is less intuitive for the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite quote but D'Hondt et al. (2004) already evidenced this phenomenon. They found that orders tend to be more aggressive when hidden depth is large on the opposite market side. The authors explain this finding by traders who discover that there are more shares available at the best opposite quote than they thought at first. For market participants, the presence of hidden depth involves a reduction in implicit transaction costs (a kind of depth improvement) and does not seem to be associated with informed trading. Table 13 provides summarized results. Except for Belgian stocks that are less liquid, parameter estimates often exhibit the expected sign at a 5% significance level. For example, our results confirm those of Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004) evidencing that aggressive orders are more frequent when bid-ask spreads are narrow and when displayed depth at the best quote on the same (opposite) side of the limit order book is large (small). Our results about disclosed depth at the next quotes 18 are also in line with the economic intuition and are consistent with the conclusions of Pascual & Veredas (2003) .
The most innovative finding is the positive and significant estimate for the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite quote. When hidden orders are present at the best 17 These estimates are presented for buy orders only but results are quite similar for sell orders. Results for sell orders are available on request.
18 The computation of this depth uses the number of shares present from the second to the fifth quotes. However, let us remind that this depth measures have been replaced by OLS residuals.
opposite quote, traders tend to be significantly more aggressive. Only one (less liquid) stock on the Dutch segment and several Belgian ones do not exhibit the expected sign with a significance level of 5%. As for the presence of hidden depth at the best quote on the same side, the results are less relevant. Indeed, only 27 (26) stocks exhibit the expected sign at the 5% level for buy (sell) orders.
When we check for the relevance of hidden depth in order placement, we obtain a Likelihood Ratio which is always significant at the 1% level 19 for the non-Belgian stocks, indicating that the constrained model (Equation [7] ) should be rejected. So, our results evidence that traders do account for the presence of hidden depth at the best quotes (at least at the best opposite quote) for their order placement strategy. When splitting orders according to their status (client, own account or LP), findings for Spread and Depth S/O 1 (see Table 14 ) are consistent with those obtained for the whole sample. However, for Depth S/O + , results are quite different. It seems that displayed depth from the second to the fifth limits are less taken into account by market members when they act for clients than when they act for their own account. This phenomenon could be explained by a larger size and/or a better market monitoring for own account orders. Similarly, client orders seem to be slightly less sensitive to the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite quote while own account orders prove to be not affected by hidden depth presence on the same market side. Results obtained for LP orders do not lead to any robust conclusion. These orders are submitted within a very specific context and should be analyzed using a larger sample of stocks with liquidity providers.
Focusing on some periods of the trading session, we find that spread, displayed depths associated with the best quotes and the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite quote still affect traders' behavior. Looking at Tables 15 and 13, we observe that displayed quantities available from the second to the fifth limits are less relevant during periods of high activity. This is particularly true during the first and the last 30 minutes of the trading session. This phenomenon could be due to several features. First, activity may prevent traders from monitoring the limit order book as they can do during less busy periods. Second, because of very frequent changes in the limit order book during these active periods, trader's response could occur when market conditions have already changed. Finally, as for the last 30 minutes of the trading session, some deadline effect could increase traders' impatience and order aggressiveness.
Conclusion
While most securities markets have moved towards greater transparency, there is today a patent trend to give market participants the opportunity to use hidden quantities. This paper investigates how the presence of hidden depth in the limit order book affects both implicit transaction costs and traders' behavior on Euronext.
As for implicit transaction costs, this paper reports how much the Cost of Round Trip Trade can be reduced when hidden quantities are taken into account. For example, hidden depth for French stocks involves a CRT decrease of about 32% for large order size, which is important in economic terms. So, ignoring hidden quantities in the order book substantially underestimates actual liquidity on Euronext and overestimates transaction costs incurred by traders. Since blue chips we analyzed are often listed on different market places and/or can be traded on different trading venues, the bias we evidenced can mislead traders when looking for the best execution.
About traders' behavior, this paper checked whether order submission can be affected by the presence of hidden quantities available at the best quotes. Since traders monitoring the limit order book can infer whether undisclosed depth is likely to be present at the best quotes or not, we analyzed how this new piece of information affects order aggressiveness. Using ordered probit models, we highlighted that the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite quote significantly increases order aggressiveness. So, traders seize the opportunity to benefit from reduced implicit transaction costs due to some hidden depth at the best opposite quote (depth improvement). Consequently, traders do not seem to associate hidden orders with informed trading.
Consistent with previous papers, our results also show that order aggressiveness is negatively related to spread and displayed depth on the opposite market side while it is positively affected by displayed depth on the same side as the incoming order. When splitting orders according to their status (client, own account or LP), we obtain similar findings but client orders appear less sensitive to both displayed depth beyond the best quotes and the presence of hidden quantities at the best opposite quote. This phenomenon suggests either that market members pay more attention to their own orders or that customers have less experience in monitoring the market than practitioners have. Results about LP orders do not lead to any robust conclusion.
As a whole, this paper evidences that ignoring undisclosed quantities leads to strong biases. Then, in a market where hidden orders are allowed, complete order book data are needed to properly address issues such as market liquidity assessment or traders' behavior.
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A Appendix
Let us take a numerical example to illustrate the aggressiveness classification we proposed. We assume first that, at time t, the limit order book looks like Table 1 and we focus on displayed depth. A buy order immediately executed for a quantity equal to or greater than 500 will be ranked in the first category. Such a buy order will make the first limit disappear from the sell side and will increase the best ask. For example, although not fully executed, a buy order for a quantity of 1500 with a limit price of 52.20 will fall into this first category too.
An order to buy a quantity lower than that offered at the best ask belongs to the second category. Although not affecting the spread, such an order will result in full and immediate execution and will reduce the depth at the best ask. For example, if a trader places a market buy order for a quantity of 100, this order will be executed in full but will not affect the best quote. The depth at the best ask will be lowered to 200.
The third category contains orders with a better limit price than competitive orders already present in the order book on the same side. This leads to a spread reduction since the best quote is improved. A buy order of any quantity with a price of 51 will belong to this category and will reduce the spread by 1 EUR.
In the fourth category, we find orders with a limit price equal to the current best quote. These orders improve the depth associated with that best limit. If a trader wishes to buy 200 shares and submits an order for that quantity with a price of 50, the depth associated with the best bid will increase up to 900 but the spread will be unchanged.
Other orders fall into the fifth category. They provide the market with liquidity but to a lesser extent than those ranked in the previous categories. If a trader places a buy order for 500 at a price of 49.00, the overall depth is improved but neither the spread nor the depth at the best limit is affected.
So, categories 1 and 2 contain orders which result in immediate execution and make the opposite best quote or the depth available at that quote worse. Orders from the other categories are stored in the order book for later execution and provide the market with liquidity.
Let us notice that an order from the first category, while spoiling the opposite best quote, could result in a spread reduction. If a trader places a buy order for a quantity of 600 with a limit price of 52, the resulting best bid and ask will be respectively equal to 52 and 52.20 instead of 50 and 52.
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Order book at time t Table 4 : N is the number of order book states observed for a particular stock. Relative Spread is the time-weighted quoted spread divided by the mid-quote and Depth 1/5 is the time-weighted depth at the first limit (1) or at the five best limits (5). F ull Depth aggregates displayed and hidden depths. Depth measures are obtained by multiplying the number of shares by the mid-quote in order to allow comparisons across stocks. Results for the AEX and BEL20 rows are simple arithmetic averages. Bold stocks are stocks with liquidity provider agreements.
Order book statistics: CAC40 Table 5 : N is the number of order book states observed for a particular stock. Relative Spread is the time-weighted quoted spread divided by the mid-quote and Depth 1/5 is the time-weighted depth at the first limit (1) or at the five best limits (5). F ull Depth aggregates displayed and hidden depths. Depth measures are obtained by multiplying the number of shares by the mid-quote in order to allow comparisons across stocks. Results for the CAC40 row are simple arithmetic averages.
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Aggressiveness according to the order status
is the number of shares at the first limit (1) Ordered probit model estimates: buy orders for AEX stocks by −1 because the lower the value of order aggressiveness category (Cat t ), the more aggressive the order. So, a negative estimate for the spread parameter indicates a negative relationship between spread and order aggressiveness. The γ i 's are the estimated thresholds. Spread denotes the prevailing absolute bid-ask spread, Depth Ordered probit model estimates: buy orders for BEL20 stocks by −1 because the lower the value of order aggressiveness category (Cat t ), the more aggressive the order. So, a negative estimate for the spread parameter indicates a negative relationship between spread and order aggressiveness. The γ i 's are the estimated thresholds. Spread denotes the prevailing absolute bid-ask spread, Depth ) are given. Let us notice that every parameter estimate has been multiplied by −1 because the lower the value of order aggressiveness category (Cat t ), the more aggressive the order. So, a negative estimate for the spread parameter indicates a negative relationship between spread and order aggressiveness. The γ i 's are the estimated thresholds. Spread denotes the prevailing absolute bid-ask spread, Depth 
